Hand Reviews: The Best of Phil Hellmuth

The Big Game I – Esfandiari v Hellmuth

We go back several years to find out first hand with Phil as he tangles with Antonio Esfandiari in the original version of the Big Game.

Tony starts the hand with while Phil has, and the blinds are $200 and $400 with a $100 ante.

• Pre-flop: Phil raises to $1,200 and both Antonio and Tony G call
• Flop comes 10 8 10 – Antonio leads out for a $4,400 bet and Phil raises to $14,400. Antonio calls – pot now is $35,400.
• Turn is the 3 ; Antonio checks and Phil bets $17,000 to which Antonio calls again.  Pot is now $69,400.
• River is the 5 and after Antonio checks, Phil bets $22,000 after going into the tank and Antonio announces “Ace-ten huh” and Phil says ”Nope” – to which Antonio folds.
• Phil A 6
• Antonio J J

This was a notable example of Phil knowing a plan going into the hand and using his image, the board texture, and guts to pull off this three barrel bluff perfectly.  It also did not help that the passive play from Antonio cost him money here.

Right out of the gate, standard raise from Phil and a flat from Antonio in the small blind with jacks. This play is fine at this level if you are prepared to strike when the board is favourable, but we cannot forget that Tony is behind him to act. A three bet here may have scared Phil off, but because he under-repped his hand and did not use this later may have been his downfall here.

The flop donk bet by Antonio is interesting but Phil raising this in position really showed that Phil committed to a three-barrel bluff right from the get-go.  Often amateur players think of a plan and then abandon it later in the hand because the board texture changes, or their opponent does something unexpected.  The fact that Antonio flatted this raise out of position gave Phil full control of this hand, and one has to think Antonio doesn’t know where he is in the hand – either way ahead or way behind and that’s a scary place to be in a bloated pot out of position.

The turn bet committed Antonio to potentially risking his entire stack on the river, but Phil should have recognized this when he bets the $17k and the amount of time he took on the river tells us that he was extremely deliberate with his river sizing.  Betting 1/3 of the pot in this manner cemented the idea in Antonio’s head that Phil had Tx – and most likely AT.  To get a world class poker player to play a hand out of position with an over pair like Phil got Antonio to do shows you the true power of aggression, the power of your table image, and telling a realistic story to win a pot.  From Antonio’s seat, AT was in Phil’s range right from the get-go and that eventually got Phil paid on two streets for a $90k and a huge boost for Phil.

The Big Game II – Martinez v Hellmuth

Sticking with the Big Game, but a different episode, we see another masterclass from Phil against the loose cannon Max Martinez from Italy.  Blinds are $200 and $400 this time.

• Pre-flop: Phil limps, as does Elky, and Martinez raises to $2,400 and Phil calls while Elky folded.
• Flop comes 8 3 10 ; Martinez bets $2,600 and Phil raises to $5,600 – to which Martinez calls.
• Turn comes the 3 and Martinez checks while Phil fires another $5,000 to which Max calls again – our pot is now $27,200.
• River is the 5 and Martinez checks.  Phil decides to bet $22,000 and after thinking, Phil says “Are you thinking of calling with AK high?” and Martinez calls for a $71,200 pot.
• Martinez A K
  Phil 5 5

Earlier in the session, Max got one by Phil and built up a significant stack, but like may loose cannons before him, Max fell victim to his own success.  His over confidence in his hand and his inability to ignore what Phil was telling him here got Phil paid handsomely.

The flop raise by Phil would normally stop a lot of amateur players in this spot from continuing.  The limp by Phil pre-flop and the call of Max’s raise should have sent warning flags to Max when the flop comes ten-high.  What hand is Phil going to have that will limp & call a raise pre-flop?

When Max decides to slow down on the turn that again misses his hand completely – and one of the few cards that actually helped Phil in this case – he sees the stubbornness of Max coming through as he check-calls $5k on a ten high board that should be favouring the big blind player.  His ability to not check-raise Phil back hurt him – giving up control to Phil was a colossal mistake but did he get stubborn because he felt like he was ahead, or because he didn’t believe Phil – either way, it felt like Max let emotions get the better of him which is a huge no-no at the poker table.

The river was un-necessary for Phil but another card that misses Max’s hand entirely and a massive bet by Phil should have been enough to get Max to fold – but Max starts talking and it feels like he’s looking for a reason to call Phil, which he eventually goes.  The boat or two pair both beat Max – heck, Phil’s hole cards beat Max, and you must hope that the loose cannon learned a valuable lesson or two in this hand – don’t let emotions dictate your play and analyze the hand before hero calling with ace high against a known pro who called your hand on the river.

The Big Game III – Laak v Hellmuth

The Big Game gave us this hand between Phil and Phil – Laak versus Hellmuth that sees Phil win.  This was the episode that the loose cannon ran it four times with Phil and took 3 of the 4 pots.  I think we all remember that hand – but this one was a very different hand than that as we break it down between the Phils. Blinds here are $200 and $400 with a $100 ante.

• Pre-flop $5,400 – Hellmuth raises to $1,200 and Laak and two others come along.
• Flop comes 10 9 8 – Laak bets $3,000 and Hellmuth calls – the other two players fold.
• Turn comes the 5 ; Laak and Hellmuth both check.
• River comes the K – Laak bets $14,200 and Hellmuth was confused replaying the hand in his head which led him to eventually folding.  He mentioned that all he could beat was KJ which led him to folding.
• Laak K 10
  Phil K Q

We go from two masterclass hands from Hellmuth to a hand where Phil looked like his previous two opponents – lost.  We’ve mentioned it already but being lost in a poker hand is a disaster for your stack and it’s clear here that Phil thinks he’s good on the river but finds a way to fold top pair on a pot raised pre-flop.

Laak’s donk bet on the flop today is seen differently than it did when this game was recorded and Phil clearly did not like it, nor did he believe it which is why Phil called with king high, even with two others in the hand.  When the turn comes a brick and Laak slows down, this may have introduced doubt into Phil’s mind that Laak’s flop bet was not of strength but rather testing Phil.
The river was the worst card for Phil – Laak clearly saw weakness in Phil and attempted to get him to call a big value bet on the river.

When you watch the video, Phil clearly is agitated that he’s been bet into again but for a huge amount and rivering top pair, he does something one wouldn’t expect – he folds.  How did he fold this?  It shows him running the hand through his head several times and he comes to conclusion that the only hand he thinks Laak has that he beats is KJo – how he got to that is a question for another day.  But he realizes that he loses to a lot more hands than he beats that are in Laak’s range and decides – correctly – to fold KQ and top pair.

This hand is an excellent example of how back in the day, the best poker players in the world were using ranges to determine the optimal decision to make at the poker table and if you are not practicing ranging your opponents, you will eventually leave money on the table.

PCA – Greenwood v Hellmuth

Our final hand takes us to the PCA where Phil Hellmuth tangled in a pot with Sam Greenwood on the feature table.  Here, blinds are $400 and $800 with a $100 ante and we are playing nine handed, far from the money.

• Pre-flop, Phil UTG raises to $1,600 and it’s folded around to Sam Greenwood who flats from the SB to create a $4,900 pot pre-flop.
• Flop comes 2 6 8 and it goes check-check.
• Turn comes the 7 and Sam leads for $3,300 to which Phil calls – our pot is now $11,500
• River is the K and Sam $8,300 – Phil only has $15k and calls.
• Phil A K
• Sam A A

Phil says after the hand “How am I still alive in this tournament?”

Even the best players in the world can play a hand poorly.  By all accounts, there’s no way Phil should still be in this tournament as all his chips should have gone into the middle before showdown.  So, how did Phil avoid taking the walk of shame here??  Let’s look:
Sam Greenwood played this hand as passively as he could have until the turn.  Flatting pre-flop with aces in the small blind – your plan is to trap for as much as you possibly can especially knowing that Phil raised pre and will most likely bet post flop.  However, when Phil decides to check the flop of 862 with the nut flush draw, one must wonder why – If the flush hits, will you get paid?  A flop eight high hits the big blind range more than UTG, so betting you expect to get called, or even raised.  Conversely, Sam checking here is leaving his aces open to cracking if the flush comes in.

So, when the flop is a total brick, Sam now leads and takes control of the hand and Phil seems to be content with calling and hoping to hit his flush.  The challenge for Phil comes on the river when his flush misses, but he hits top pair.  Sam betting big puts Phil in a terrible spot – his SPR is just over 1, and he wants to call as the chances that Sam has a pair of eights is high or something similar since, he was in the big blind.

Phil somehow avoided taking control of the pot, putting more chips in, and getting pushed over the edge on the river because Sam didn’t go for it all.  In bigger buy-in tournaments, sometimes even the pros play more passively based on the situation.